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The Ratchet Wreck:
Equality’s Leveling Down Problem
Louis Michael Seidman
Constitutional equality law has a two-way ratchet problem. When someone demonstrates
that a government policy treats her unequally, the injury can be remedied by improving things
for the claimant, but it can also be remedied by leaving the claimant’s status unchanged while
making things worse for the people advantaged by the policy.1 If a court chooses the latter
option, it diminishes the welfare of some people while arguably not improving welfare for
anyone else.2 Why is that a good idea?
A familiar example dramatically illustrates the problem. The Supreme Court has rejected
the argument that the disproportionate application of the death penalty to African Americans
violates the Equal Protection Clause.3 Suppose the Court were to accept the argument. The
government could remedy the problem by executing fewer African Americans, but it could also
remedy the problem by executing more people of other races.
To sharpen the point with an admittedly extreme example, imagine that a condemned
African American brings a suit claiming that racial disproportion in capital punishment cases
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1
See, e.g., Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 362 (1970 (Harlan, J., concurring) (where a statute is
defective because of underinclusion “a court may declare it a nullity and order that the benefits not extend to the
class that the legislature intended to benefit, or it may extend the coverage of the statute to include those who are
aggrieved by exclusion.”)
In theory, the Court could adopt an intermediate solution, extending or restricting the benefit to some
but not others. But although such a compromise might solve the constitutional problem in some cases, the Court
has held that such a restructuring of legislation “should not be undertaken lightly.” Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S.
76, 92 (1979).
2
For arguments that downward leveling does improve the status of people disadvantaged by the law or
policy, see TAN xx, infra.
3
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 179 (1987).

2
violates his equal protection right, but instead of requesting the nullification of his own death
sentence, insists on the imposition of a death sentence on a similarly situated non-African
American. Should a court entertain this suit?
It takes some work to explain why it should.4 Many judges would conclude that the
plaintiff lacks standing to demand this remedy.5 Even if he does, many judges would conclude
that executing an additional non-African American does nothing to remedy the real and
immediate harm facing the condemned man, while imposing real and immediate harm on a party
not before the court.6
That is not to say that it is impossible to do the work and to make the counterargument.
As I explain below,7 a lot turns on whether equality protects only material welfare or whether it
also protects against “expressive” or comparative harm. If condemned black defendants suffer
from a dignitary injury or if freedom that is judicially cognizable or if freedom from execution is
a comparative good, perhaps a court should grant the requested relief.

4

Cf. Christopher J. Peters, Equality Reconsidered, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 1210, 1263 (1997):
There is really only one kind of case in which prescriptive equality ever matters, in which it ever purports
to tell us to do something we would not already do under some conception of nonegalitarian justice. That is
the case in which a person already has been treated wrongly-- unjustly--and we must decide whether,
because of that fact, to treat another similar person similarly unjustly. Someone who believes in the force of
prescriptive equality will contend, at least, that a reason exists to treat the subsequent person unjustly; she
might even contend that this reason is decisive in a particular case. The result, if this person gets her way,
will be two instances of unjust treatment instead of only one.

5

Cf. Barr v. American Assn. of Political consultants, 140 S. Ct. 2335, 2366 (2020) (Gorsuch, J, concurring in
the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (questioning whether a party would have standing to argue that
someone else should be deprived of a benefit).
6
Cf. id. at 2365 (criticizing downward ratchet for harming “strangers to this suit.”)
The most dramatic findings of the study that the Court considered in McCleskey, concerned the race of
the victim, not of the alleged perpetrator. See 481 U.S., at 286. A downward ratchet might be more plausible
where the equal protection violation is conceived of as the involving under protection of black victims rather than
as the under protection of black defendants. For perceptive discussion, see Randall Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp:
Race, Capital Punishment, and the Supreme Court, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1388, 1429-40 (1988).
7

See TAN xx-xx, infra.

3
As I will also demonstrate below,8 courts have often attempted to avoid hard questions
like these by leveling up – that is by allowing advantaged persons to keep their advantage and
extending that advantage to the previously disadvantaged class.9 But not always and not lately.
In two recent cases, the Court required the government to level down.
In Sessions v. Morales-Santana,10 the justices confronted a statute dealing with the
citizenship of children born outside the United States to unmarried parents when only one parent
was a United States citizen. The law provided that if the child’s unmarried father was a United
States citizen, the child was entitled to citizenship if the father had lived in the United States for
five years prior to the child’s birth. In contrast, if the unmarried mother was a United States
citizen, she could transmit citizenship to her child if she has lived in the United States for only
one year.11
In an opinion written by Justice Ginsburg, the Court held that this gender-based
distinction violated the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment Due Process
Clause,12 but nonetheless found that the Court was “not equipped to grant the relief Morales–
Santana seeks.”13 According to the Court, if “[p]ut to the choice, Congress . . . would have

8

See TAN xx-xx, infra.
See, e.g., Califano v. Westcott, 443, U.S. 76 (1979) (discrimination in provision of benefits under social
security to children of unemployed men and women remedied by extending the benefit); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430
U.S. 199 (1977) (discrimination in provision of benefits under social security to widows and widowers remedied by
extending the benefit); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1979) (discrimination in provision of social
security survivorship benefits remedied by extending the benefit). See also Even H. Caminker, A Norm-Based
Model for Underinclusive Statutes, 95 Yale L. J. 1185, 1186-87 (1986) (noting that courts usually chose to make
“vineyards” instead of “graveyards” in remedying underinclusive statutes); Pamela Karlan, Race, Rights, and
Remedies in Criminal Adjudication, 96 Mich. L. Rev. 2001, 2027 (1998) (“The few examples in ordinary equal
protection of levelling down . . . stand out precisely because of their rarity.”)
10
137 S. Ct. 1678 (2017).
11
Compare 8 U.S.C. §1401(a) (2012) (requiring five-year residency for unmarried-citizen fathers) with 8
U.S.C. §1409(c) (requiring one-year residency for unmarried-citizen mothers).
12
137 S. Ct., at 1689-98.
13
Id.
9
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abrogated [the] exception, preferring preservation of the general rule.”14 The Court therefore
solved the inequality problem by denying the more generous citizenship rule to mothers and
fathers alike.

The holding left non-citizen fathers no better off and made things worse for non-

citizen mothers. Sadly, fewer people ended up with access to citizenship than would have had
access if the suit had never been brought.
A second case produced an even more problematic outcome. In Barr v. American Assn.
of Political Consultants, Inc.,15 the Court confronted a challenge to a federal statute that
prohibited virtually all robocalls to cell phones but made an exception for calls designed to
collect debt owed to or guaranteed by the United States.16 Plaintiffs, who wished to use
robocalls to engage in political speech, argued that the law violated their free speech rights.
Plaintiffs’ claims were grounded in the First Amendment rather than the Equal Protection
Clause, but it turns out that First Amendment doctrine has an equality component. Citing wellestablished precedent,17 the Court held that statutes discriminating based on the content of speech
were subject to strict scrutiny.18 Because the distinction between government debt calls and
other calls was based on content and could not survive this scrutiny, it was unconstitutional.19
Unfortunately for the plaintiffs’ their victory was Pyrrhic. Instead of granting them the
right to make calls, the Court again leveled down, thereby depriving government debt collectors
of their statutory right.20 This outcome reproduces the oddity of the result in Morales-Santana

14

Id. at 1700. For a discussion of the Court’s effort to resolve the ratchet problem by guessing what
Congress would have wanted if it had addressed the problem, see TAN xx, Infra.
15
140 S. Ct. 2335 (2020).
16
See 44 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) (making it illegal with certain exceptions to make a call with automatic
dialing system or artificial or prerecorded voice to cellular service for which party is charged “unless such call is
made solely to collect a debt owed to or guaranteed by the United States.”)
17
See, e.g., Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155 (2015); Police Dept. Of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92
(1972); Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1971).
18
140 S. Ct., at 2346.
19
Id. at 2347.
20
Id. at 2348-54.
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by making one group of people worse off without benefiting the others, but it also creates an
even deeper paradox. Bizarrely, in the name of freedom of speech, the Court’s decision results
in the suppression of more speech than Congress had required.21 And to make matters still
worse, as discussed below,22 there are indications in the plurality opinion that ratcheting down in
this fashion will become more frequent.
These anomalies are mitigated by the fact that in both cases, Court did no more than
establish a default rule.23 The decisions seemingly reduce total welfare, but they leave Congress
free to override the initial judgment in future cases by amending the statutes to extend, rather
than withdraw the benefit.24 But in a third recent case, the Court seems to have held that it is
impermissible for state courts to set a similar default rule. Instead, at least in some

21

Cf. Evan Camniker, note x, supra, at 1196) (arguing that when a statute violates the content-neutrality
rule, “an inchoate First Amendment norm often prefers the remedial choice of ‘more speech, not enforced
silence.’”)
22
See TAN xx-xx, infra.
23
One should not, however, underestimate the power of default rules. Congressional inertia is a strong
force that may often prevents legislative correction. See, e.g., Guido Calibresi, A Common Law for the Age of
Statutes 4 (1982) (discussing legislative inertia.) Cf. Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 121 (1946) (“we walk in
quicksand when we try to find in the absence of corrective legislation a controlling legal principle.”) See also TAN
xx-xx, infra.
24
In state cases, the Court often remands the case to the state court to make the initial ratchet decision.
See note x, supra.
Discussion of ratchets decisions as default rules is often unnecessarily complicated by treating the
problem as involving constitutional remedies. When so characterized, the problem becomes ensnared in debates
about whether Congress or the courts has final remedial power. Cf. Caminker, note xx, supra, at 1190 & n. 18
(discussing whether legislatures or courts have final authority over remedial questions). But the ratchet problem
differs in an important way from most remedial disputes. Most disputes about remedy revolve around whether
the remedy is entailed by the constitutional right itself, or whether it is merely a discretionary means to enforce
the right. Compare, e.g., Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 437 (2000) (holding that Congress cannot
overrule Miranda v. Arizona, 484 U.S. 436 (1966) because “Congress may not legislatively supersede our decisions
interpreting and applying the Constitution”) with id., at 450 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that Congress can
overrule Miranda because announced “only ‘prophylactic’ rules that go beyond the right of compelled
incrimination.”) For a powerful deconstruction of this distinction, see Daryl K. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and
Remedial Equilibration, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 857 (1999). Assuming arguendo that the distinction can be maintained,
the ratchet issue does not implicate it. That is because equality claims by their nature can be fully remedied by an
upward or downward ratchet. There is therefore usually no plausible argument that one remedy or the other is an
entailment of the constitutional right. For this reason, ratchet cases are better conceptualized as instances where
constitutional law provides no answer and where, therefore, the matter is left to the political branches. But see
TAN xx, infra.
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circumstances, state courts, unlike the United States Supreme Court, are prohibited from leveling
down.
The holding came in the context of a complex state program providing benefits to parents
who enrolled their children in private schools. Relying on a provision in the Montana
constitution that prohibited aid to any school “controlled in whole or in part by any church, sect,
or denomination,”25 the Montana Court held that the aid could not flow to church-related
schools.26 However, as a remedial matter, the state court chose to level down: Rather than
permitting aid to only secular schools, it invalidated the entire program.27
In Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue,28 the United States Supreme Court
reversed. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Roberts began his analysis by pointing out that
the Free Exercise Clause, like the Free Speech Clause, has an equality component. The clause
“‘protects religious observers against unequal treatment’ and against ‘laws that impose special
disabilities on the basis of religious status.’”29 According to the Court, the Montana constitution
violated this requirement by imposing a special disability on religiously affiliated schools.30
As with all equality claims, this one might be resolved by either leveling up or leveling
down, and, superficially, it seems that the Court recognized this freedom. At the conclusion of
his analysis Chief Justice Roberts stated that “A State need not subsidize private education. But
once a State decides to do so, it cannot disqualify some private schools solely because they are

25
26
27
28
29
30

Art. X, section 6, Mont. Code Ann §15-30-3101.
See Espinoza v. Mont. Dept. of Revenue, 393 Mont. 446, 435 P. 3d 603 (2018).
See id. at 469, 435 P. 3d, at 615.
140 S. Ct. 2246 (2020).
Id. at 2254-55 (quoting from Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia v. Comer, 137 S.Ct. 2012, 2021 (2017).
Id. at 2255.
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religious.”31 This language would seem to leave Montana free to level down by ending its
subsidy for religious and secular schools alike.
But as both Justice Ginsburg and Justice Sotomayor pointed out in their separate
dissents,32 this is precisely what Montana had done. The Montana supreme court held that as a
matter of state law, equality would be achieved by ending the program for all students. The
Court’s decision reversing that state judgment entails a holding that the state court could not
level down in this fashion.33 How is that reversal consistent with the Court’s own decisions in
Morales-Santana and Barr leveling down and with its own statement that Montana is free to
withdraw all subsidies for private education?
Here is the Court’s answer:
The Montana Legislature created the scholarship program; the Legislature never chose to
end it, for policy or other reasons. The program was eliminated by a court, and not based
on some innocuous principle of state law. Rather, the Montana Supreme Court
invalidated the program pursuant to a state law provision that expressly discriminates on
the basis of religious status.34
The first half of the Court’s assertion runs up against the well-established principle that
except in unusual situations,35 federal law has nothing to say about whether states make law
through their legislatures or their courts.36 The second half is impeached by the fact that the
“state law provision” did not “discriminate[ ] on the basis of religious status.” Instead, the

31

Id. at 2261.
Id. at 2279 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); id at 2292 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
33
The case is therefore in tension with the Court’s usual practice when it strikes down a state statute on
equality grounds of remanding the case to the state courts to decide whether to level up or down. See note x,
supra. See also Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (remanding to state court); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268
(1979) (same); Stanton v. Stanton, 431 U.S. 7 (1975) (same).
34
140 S. Ct., at 2262.
35
Cf. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 115-131 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (arguing that state courts
cannot change legislative judgments about how electors are chosen in presidential elections). But cf. Arizona State
Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commn., 576 U.S. 787, 814 (2015) (reference to “legislature” in
elections clause of Constitution permits redistricting by independent electoral commission).
36
See Bush v. Gore, 531, U.S. 98, 112 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (“[I]n ordinary cases, the distribution of
power among the branches of a State’s government raise no questions of federal constitutional law.”)
32
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provision, as authoritatively interpreted by the Montana Court, mandated the termination of the
entire program. With no program to subsidize private education, there was no inequality and,
hence, no free exercise violation.
Espinoza might be cabined or explained on the ground that the state court’s result was
somehow infected by its initial, mistaken assumption that the state constitutional provision was
valid,37 although it is hard to see how this is so, since the provision was valid if interpreted to
require equal treatment of religious and nonreligious schools. Perhaps the case is simply an
anomaly. Still, when Espinoza is taken together with Morales-Santana and Barr, these recent
cases are sufficient to demonstrate that our ratchet rules are in disarray.
If one looks beyond these three cases, things are actually much worse. The first Part of
this Article surveys the chaotic landscape. At various times, the Court has held or implied that:
* Courts faced with an equality claim must level up;38
* Courts faced with an equality claim must level down;39
* Courts faced with an equality claim may level up or down;40
*Courts faced with an equality claim should guess whether Congress preferred leveling
up or leveling down;41
* When a federal court lacks the power to order a state to level up, it should dismiss
the case.42
* Because a court could theoretically level down, it should deny the equality claim
entirely and therefore leave the original inequality undisturbed.43

37

See Espinoza v. Montana Dept. of Reenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246, 2262 (2020). (arguing that the Montana
Court’s error came at the beginning of its analysis where it found that the Montana constitutional provision did not
violate the free exercise clause and that in the absence of a state law violation, the Montana Court would have had
no basis for invalidating the statute).
38
See TAN xx-xx, infra.
39
See TAN xx, infra.
40
See TAN xx, infra.
41
See TAN xx, infra.
42
See TAN xx, infra.
43
See TAN xx, infra.
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Matters are still further complicated by difficult questions about standing in cases where
the court ratchets down or has the potential to do so,44 by issues of severability,45 and by
controversy concerning the relevance of legislative purpose in ratchet cases.46
How might we clean up the mess? A promising strategy is to map various solutions onto
the functions served by equality claims in the first place. Part Two undertakes that task. Many
results that otherwise seem anomalous become more plausible if one embraces a particular
normative justification for the equality guarantee. For example, in the hypothetical death penalty
case, an expressivist theory might justify a downward ratchet, while a welfarist theory might
require an upward ratchet. The problem is that the Justices have been unable to agree on and
consistently apply a single, normative justification. The ratchet wreck is therefore
epiphenomenal. It is an external manifestation of the Court’s confusion about the reasons for
equality. Confusion about reasons unsurprisingly begets confusion in outcomes.
In Part Three, I conclude with the observation that our ratchet difficulties reflect a still
deeper ambivalence about the equality requirement itself. For complicated reasons, the potential
for downward ratchets is necessary to make that requirement meaningful, yet the seeming
irrationality of this remedy obstructs a full-throated embrace of the equality norm.
I.

Rules for Ratchets

A. Leveling by Guessing

44
45
46

See TAN xx, infra.
See TAN xx, infra.
See TAN xx, infra.
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As noted above,47 the importance of judicial leveling decisions is diminished by the fact
that the Court usually, although not always48 characterizes its decision as a default rule that the
political branches are free to reverse.49 Often the Court goes beyond pointing to the possibility of
ex post correction and attributes its decisions to ex ante judgments by Congress. On this approach,
when Congress has provided express instruction, by, for example, specifying a severability rule in
case the statute is invalidated, the Court should follow the instructions.50 When Congress has not
provided express instructions, the Court’s role is to guess what the political branches would have
wanted had they known that their initial actions violated the equality requirement.51
There is an internal logic to the guessing approach. Because equality’s mandate can be
satisfied by leveling either up or down, the Constitution provides no guidance as to the right
outcome.52 On conventional views about the Court’s role, it therefore lacks a legitimate basis for
resolving the question. The only option is to turn to the political branches for a definitive decision.
Ultimately, though this flight from judicial responsibility proves an unsatisfactory solution
to the ratchet problem. Congressional inertia makes default rules sticky.53 The theoretical
possibility of legislative reversal should not distract us from the practical reality that the Court’s
ratchet decisions will often be final.

47

See TAN xx, supra.
See TAN xx, infra.
49
See Evan Camniker, note x, supra, at 1187 (making this point).
50
See, e.g., Barr v. American Association of Political Consultants, 140 S. Ct. 2335, 2349 (2020 (Kavanaugh, J.,
announcing the judgment of the Court) (except in extraordinary circumstances, courts should follow severability
provisions.) On the relationship between severability and the ratchet problem, see note x, infra.
51
See, e.g., Heckler v. Matthews, 465 U.S. 728, 737 n.5 (Court should adhere to congressional preference).
See also Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Judicial Authority to Repair Unconstitutional Legislation, 28 Clev.
St. L. Rev. 301,317 (1979) (“the court’s function, then, is to serve as a short-term surrogate for the legislature.”)
But see Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76, 91-92 (1979) (“We may assume arguendo that, if Congress knew in 1968
what it knows now, it might well have adopted the . . . model suggested by the Commissioner. But this does not
mean that the [program] should be restructured along these lines by a federal court.”)
52
But cf. Evan Camniker, note x, supra, at 1191-1210 (arguing that inchoate or underenforced
constitutional norms can guide the decision).
53
See note x, supra.
48
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One might explain this stickiness by insisting that the Court is very good at guessing.
Perhaps there are few legislative reversals because legislatures are satisfied with what the Court
has done. And if the Court were to begin making wrong guesses, then, perhaps, we could rely on
post hoc legislative correction to solve the problem.
Even if one accepts this dubious explanation, however, serious problems with judicial
guessing as a solution to the ratchet problem remain. First, there is a temporal difficulty. The
Court is making a guess about the wishes of a past legislature, but legislative correction must come
from the legislators who are now in office. There is no reason to think that the wishes of these two
groups of people necessarily coincide and there is usually no evidence at all about what
contemporary legislators think about the problem.
Second, there is a formal difficulty. The Constitution specifies the method by which
Congress can create mandatory legal rules: passage of a bill with a with majority votes in both
Houses and submission them to the President for his signature. The Constitution provides no
support for the creation of mandatory legal rules by the unarticulated preferences of an unspecified
number of legislators concerning a hypothetical state of affairs that has not yet come about.54
Third, the formal problem is complemented by the familiar problem of defining collective
intent. Formal voting rules provide an artificial but necessary means of instantiating that intent.
When no formal vote is taken – indeed, when most of the potential voters have not even thought
about the problem – determining a hypothetical collective intent is necessarily an exercise in
projection rather than discovery.55

54

See, e.g., John C, Grabow, Congressional Silence and the Search for Legislative Intent: Adventure into
“Speculative Unrealities, 64 B.U. L. Rev. 737, 746 (arguing that Congress cannot legislate by silence). See generally,
Laurence H. Tribe, Toward a Syntax of the Unsaid: Construing the Sounds of Congressional and Constitutional
Silence, 57 Ind. L. J. 515 (1982).
55
See, e.g., Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading the Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 392 (2012)
(arguing that collective intent is “pure fiction” because legislators have their own subjective views about what they

12
Finally, even if these arguments are unpersuasive, there are strong indications that the
Court itself has disowned the guessing approach. In Barr, Justice Kavanaugh, writing for a
plurality of the Court,56 acknowledged that in the past, the Court had searched for “indicia of
congressional intent,”57 but expressly rejected this approach:
[E]xperience has shown that this formulation often leads to an analytical dead end. That
is because courts are not well-equipped to imaginatively reconstruct a prior Congress’
hypothetical intent.58
Instead of attributing its decision to Congress, Justice Kavanaugh formulated the Court’s own rule,
which he took responsibility for creating.59
Moreover, even apart from the Court’s recent, explicit statement in Barr, we have evidence
from the Court’s prior opinions.

In many cases, it has purported to guess at Congress’s

hypothetical intent, but in many other cases, it has insisted on its own solution. The next Parts
provide examples of both approaches.
B. Leveling Up

are voting on, or no views at all). But cf. Caleb Nelson, What Is Textualism?, 51 Va. L. Rev . 347, 362 (2005)
(arguing that it is sensible to ask whether interpretive tool tends to minimize or aggregate gap between what
legislators thought they were adopting and how statute is interpreted); Kurt Greenawalt, How Law Can Be
Determinate, 38 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1, 20 (1990) (outlining circumstances under which collective intent can be
determinate).
56
Justice Kavanaugh wrote only for himself and Justices Roberts and Alito. Barr v. American Assn. of Political
Consultants, 140 S. Ct. 2335, 2341 (2020). In separate opinions, Justice Sotomayor and Justice Breyer, joined by
Justices Ginsburg and Kagan, agreed that the Court should ratchet down but expressed no views about why this
was the right result. Id. at 2357 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 2363 (Breyer, J., concurring).
57
Id. at 2350.
58
Id.
59
Id. at 2353. See also Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76, 91-92 (1979) (declining to restructure the statute in
the way that, Court assumed arguendo, Congress would have preferred).
As a formal matter, the Barr Court addressed its rule to the issue of severability rather than ratcheting. In
equal treatment cases, however, the two issues overlap. If the provision unconstitutionally extending the benefit
is severed, then the Court levels down. If the offending provision is found nonseverable, then the Court levels up.
For example, in Barr, the Court found that the provision granting government debt collectors the right to make
robocalls was severable. The result was that no one was permitted to make such calls – a downward ratchet. Had
the entire provision outlawing robocalls been invalidated, then everyone would have been permitted to make
them – an upward ratchet. See also note x, infra.
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Assuming that the Court is not merely reflecting inchoate legislative will, how should it
resolve ratchet controversies? The simplest way is to level up. By granting a benefit to the
disadvantaged class, the court remedies the equality problem without reducing the welfare of the
advantaged class. Presumably for this reason, ratcheting up has been the standard remedy for
inequality.60 In many cases, courts do not even entertain the possibility of doing anything else.61
Few people thought that ending the right of straight people to marry was a possible remedy for
the failure to recognize gay marriage62 or that the remedy for California’s failure to subsidize
appeals for indigent criminal defendants was denying everyone a right to appeal.63 Even in cases
where ratcheting down is a more plausible alternative, courts have frequently not bothered to
discuss it.64 And when they have discussed the problem, they have often concluded that
ratcheting up is the more sensible solution.65
As discussed above, courts have usually also recognized that they are making default
judgments. They have not denied the power of legislature or, in state cases, state courts, to

60

See note x, supra.
For example, in Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 592 U.S. ___ (2020), the Court granted
emergency injunctive relief against a state regulation issued in conjunction with the Covid crisis that limited
attendance at religious institutions while not imposing similar limits on businesses the Governor had deemed
“essential.” Neither the Justices in the majority nor those in the dissent considered the possibility of ratcheting
down by imposing similar restrictions on the “essential” businesses.
62
Cf. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (leveling up to guarantee the right to same-sex marriage.) But cf.
Martha C. Nussbaum, A Right to Marry?, 98 Cal. L. Rev. 667, 694 (2010) (asking whether “government [should]
continue to marry people at all?”)
Leveling down is not an option where an independent constitutional provision guarantees the right of the
advantaged class to the benefit. See Deborah L. Brake, When Equality Leaves Everyone Worse Off: The Problem of
Leveling Down in Equality Law, 46 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 513, 553-54 (2004); Evan H. Caminker, note x., supra, at
1187, n. 8. Caminker expands on this point to argue persuasively that independent, but inchoate or underenforced
constitutional norms should sometimes control the ratchet decision. See id., at 1191-1209.
63
Cf. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (resolving equality problem with regard to indigent
defendants by leveling up).
64
See, e.g., Jiminez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 637-38 (1974) (leveling up without explanation); Frontier v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 691 n. 25 (1973) (same).
65
See note x, supra.
61
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remedy the equality problem by depriving the favored class of its benefits.66 Indeed, in some
state cases, the Supreme Court has remanded to the state court to make the initial ratchet
decision.67
In a few notable cases, however, the Court has seemingly insisted on ratcheting up. I
have already discussed one example: In Espinoza, the Court refused to permit the state supreme
court to ratchet down by ending the aid program for all students. Instead, it insisted that the state
ratchet up by extending the program to students wishing to use the aid to attend sectarian
schools.68
For reasons that remain obscure, the Court has also held that leveling up is
constitutionally required in cases where a defendant is criminally convicted under a
discriminatory statute. In Grayned v. City of Rockford,69 the Court reversed the defendant’s
criminal conviction under an antipicketing statute because the statute had an exception for labor
picketing.70 After defendant’s conviction, the legislature repealed the labor exception, thereby
leveling down, but the Court held that this subsequent action was irrelevant because “we must
consider the facial constitutionality of the ordinance in effect when appellant was arrested and
convicted.”71 The Court left unclear why the government could solve an inequality problem with
downward leveling in a civil, but not a criminal context.
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These cases might be dismissed as aberrational. As I’ve discussed above, Espinoza arose
in an unusual posture because the state court’s ratchet decision was premised on a state
constitutional provision that, the United States Supreme Court thought, was itself
unconstitutional.72 A special rule for criminal cases might be justified based on the ban on ex
post facto criminal punishment.73
The result in Griffin v. County School Bd. of Prince Edward County,74 is more difficult
to cabin. At the height of “massive resistance” to Brown v. Board of Education,75 school officials
in Prince Edward County, Virginia, responded to a desegregation order by refusing to levy taxes
to support public education and closing all public schools. Private schools were established to
educate white children and, the state legislature provided tuition assistance and tax credits on a
nonracial basis to children attending private schools. Parents of African Americans refused the
aid, and the result was that many African American children did not attend school for four years
while the litigation progressed. 76
On these facts, the Supreme Court held that the school closing was unconstitutional.77
Although the Court did not use ratchet language, the effect of its decision was to prevent the state
from ratcheting down. The state had “solved” the equality problem by depriving all children of a
public education, but the Court held that this solution was unconstitutional and that the inequality
had to be remedied by providing all children a public, nonsegregated education.
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Two obvious explanations for the Court’s decisions do not quite do the trick. First, the
Court gestured toward a claim that the ratchet-down solution violated the equal protection clause
because both black and white students in Prince Edward County were discriminated against
when compared to students in the rest of Virginia, who could attend public schools.78 But having
made this suggestion, the Court quickly disowned it:
[T]here is no rule that counties, as counties, must be treated alike; the Equal Protection
Clause relates to equal protection of the laws “between persons as such rather than
between areas.” . . . A State, of course, has a wide discretion in deciding whether laws
shall operate statewide or shall operate only in certain counties, the legislature “having in
mind the needs and desires of each.” A State may wish to suggest . . . that there are
reasons why one county ought not to be treated like another.79
Second, the Court emphasized the state financial support for the segregated, private
schools that were serving white students.80 True, black students were at least theoretically also
eligible for tuition grants, but Brown had already held that segregated public education was
“inherently unequal.”81 It was not a big stretch to find that state-funded segregated private
education was also unconstitutional.
But if this was the problem, then the apparent solution would be invalidation of the
tuition grant program, and, indeed, the Court did just that.82 In an unusual (for desegregation
cases in this era) separate opinion, Justices Clark and Harlan indicated that they would have
stopped there.83 The majority disagreed. Even without public funding for private schools, the
Court held, Prince Edward county was obligated to level up by reopening its schools rather than
to level down by leaving them closed.
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Having flirted with these unsatisfactory explanations, the Court finally came to the point.
In a striking passage, the Court asserted:
the record in the present case could not be clearer that Prince Edward's public schools
were closed and private schools operated in their place with state and county assistance,
for one reason, and one reason only: to ensure, through measures taken by the county and
the State, that white and colored children in Prince Edward County would not, under any
circumstances, go to the same school. Whatever nonracial grounds might support a
State's allowing a county to abandon public schools, the object must be a constitutional
one, and grounds of race and opposition to desegregation do not qualify as
constitutional.84
At first, it might seem that this reasoning has the same flaw that makes the result in
Espinoza troubling. Given the setting in which the case was decided, there can be no doubt that
the Court was correct about the motivation of state officials. The question, though, is why that
motivation made their actions unconstitutional. If it is really true that equality problems can be
resolved by leveling down as well as by leveling up, then, it would seem, there is no
constitutional difficulty with treating all children equally badly by closing public schools. Just as
the Montana legislature could constitutionally end all tuition grants rather than providing them to
children attending sectarian schools, so too, Prince Edward County could constitutionally end all
public education rather than providing it in racially desegregated form. And if it is constitutional
to adopt this “remedy,” then it is hard to see why the “object” of doing so is unconstitutional.
There are nonetheless ways to understand the Court’s reasoning that might explain the
outcome. First, the Court might be understandably concerned that the threat to ratchet down
would deter efforts to vindicate equality rights. If potential litigants can expect no gain from the
litigation, why go to the trouble?85 The point is especially powerful in Prince Edward, where
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there was actually a double downward ratchet. In most such cases, the status of the
disadvantaged party remains unchanged, while the status of others deteriorates. But in Prince
Edward, the African American plaintiffs also suffered injury when they were denied not only
integrated public education, but also segregated public education.
The point is reenforced, or perhaps merely recharacterized, if phrased in terms of Article
III standing requirements. In general, plaintiffs have access to federal courts only if they can
demonstrate that they have suffered an “injury in fact,” that the injury is caused by the
government action they object to, and that the injury that will be remedied by the relief that the
court will provide.86

When a court levels up, all three requirements are satisfied. The unequal

denial of the benefit constitutes the injury in fact, the denial of the benefit is caused by the
putatively unconstitutional denial of equality, and the provision of the benefit remedies the
violation. But if the court is free to level down, then there is a problem with two of the three
requirements. 87 Leveling down means that the unequal treatment has not caused the plaintiff’s
injury and that the court’s judgment will not remedy it. The prospect of leveling down, in turn,
means that it is “merely ‘speculative’” that the decree will remedy plaintiff’s injury.88 We would
then be confronted with the disturbing possibility that plaintiffs might never have standing to
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bring equality claims. The implausibility of that result,89 in turn, argues for a mandatory upward
ratchet.90
Second, the Court may well have believed that the decision to ratchet down, like the
decision to segregate public schools in the first place, was motivated by racial animus and by the
desire to preserve a more general, unconstitutional racial hierarchy. This concern was especially
salient in the era of “massive resistance” directed against the Court’s effort to end officially
sanctioned Jim Crow. As the Court put the point, “[w]hatever nonracial grounds might support a
State's allowing a county to abandon public schools, the object must be a constitutional one, and
grounds of race and opposition to desegregation do not qualify as constitutional.”91 Perhaps the
outcome in Espinoza could be similarly explained. Several of the justices wrote about how antiCatholic animus motivated the constitutional prohibition on aid to sectarian schools.92 On this
view, Montana Supreme Court’s decision to level down gave effect to Montana law infected by
religious bias.
These arguments, in turn, might form the basis for a general rule favoring mandatory
upward ratchets. It will often – perhaps always – be the case that the prospect of a downward
ratchet will discourage suits to enforce equality rights, and there will often be problems of
explaining why a plaintiff has standing when the result of the suit is a downward ratchet.
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Animus toward the disadvantaged class may not always be as obvious as it was in the
context of massive resistance to Brown, but it is nonetheless a real possibility whenever the
legislature chooses to deprive everyone of benefits rather than to extend them to the
disadvantaged class. Indeed, as discussed below, a prominent defense of the equality right is
based on just this possibility.93 Defenders of equality argue that the requirement that benefits be
equally extended “smokes out” government policies based on nothing more than animus. They
insist that if there is no good explanation for the failure of government to extend a benefit to
equally situated people, the inference is strong that the failure is based on a bad reason. If that is
true, then arguably the inference becomes even stronger when the government is willing to go so
far as to withdraw previously granted benefits to the advantaged class so as to avoid benefiting
the disadvantaged class.94
For these reasons, a court that was so inclined could have built on Prince Edward to
create a more general presumptive or absolute upward ratchet requirement. In fact, though, in
the wake of Prince Edward, the Court moved in the opposite direction.
In Palmer v. Thompson,95 the Court faced a set of facts closely analogous to those in
Prince Edward. Like Prince Edward County, Jackson, Mississippi operated a segregated
government facility – in this case, municipal swimming pools. As in Prince Edward County, a
court order declared the segregation unconstitutional, and like Prince Edward County, Jackson
responded by closing the facility.
On this occasion, though, the Court in an opinion by Justice Black, who had also
authored Prince Edward, held that leveling down was constitutionally permissible. In the
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Court’s view, the city was under no constitutional obligation to operate swimming pools in the
first place,96 and closing the pools for black and white patrons alike established equality.97 The
Court distinguished Griffin on the ground that there the state had supported private segregated
schools, whereas in Palmer, there was no allegation that the state was supporting private,
segregated swimming pools.98 It provided no explanation for why if this was the problem in
Prince Edward, prohibiting state subsidies to private, segregated schools was not a sufficient
solution.
What about the problem of animus toward the disadvantaged class? In Prince Edward,
Justice Black had written that “[w]hatever nonracial grounds might support a State's allowing a
county to abandon public schools, the object must be a constitutional one, and grounds of race
and opposition to desegregation do not qualify as constitutional.”99 It was similarly obvious that
Jackson had closed its swimming pools to avoid integration, and the Court nowhere denied this
fact. Justice Black conceded that his own language in Griffin might make legislative purpose
relevant to constitutionality,100 but he now claimed that “the focus . . . was on the actual effects
of the enactments,” rather than on motive or purpose.101 “No case in this Court,” Black insisted,
“has held that a legislative act may violate equal protection solely because of the motivations of
the men who voted for it.”102

96

Id. at 220. Although neither the Griffin Court nor the Palmer Court mentioned the possibility, the two
cases might be distinguished on the ground that there is a fundamental right to public education but not to public
swimming pools. Compare San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (holding that
there is no fundamental right to education) with Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 224 (1982) (holding that
discrimination against undocumented persons with respect to public education “can hardly be considered rational
unless it furthers some substantial goal of the State.”)
97
Id. (“this is not a case where whites are permitted to use public facilities while blacks are denied access.”)
98
Id. at 221-22.
99
377 U.S., at 231.
100
403 U.S., at 225.
101
Id.
102
Id.

22
More recently, Palmer itself has fallen into disfavor. In Washington v. Davis,103 the
Court announced the “basic equal protection principle” that “the invidious quality of a law
claimed to be racially discriminatory must ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory
purpose”104 and dismissed Palmer’s contrary language as “dicta.”105 Moreover, as noted above,
several justices in Espinoza pointed to the discriminatory purpose of Montana’s “no aid”
provision in the course of insisting on an upward ratchet.106
In light of these developments, one cannot dismiss mandatory upward leveling as a
solution to the ratchet problem. Still, the modern Court has also downplayed the risk of deterring
equality suits, arguing that plaintiffs will be sufficiently motivated by the possibility of an
upward ratchet or by the naked desire to be treated equally.107 Similarly, it has said that
removing an obstacle to an upward ratchet is sufficient relief to establish standing108 or, more
recently, that the remedied injury is not the material deprivation but the mere refusal to provide
equal treatment.109
The upshot is that although the Court’s dominant approach permits upward or downward
leveling, mandatory upward ratchets are not off the table. Even more surprisingly, though, there
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are also more than a few cases that not only reject mandatory upward ratchets, but also insist on
mandatory downward ratchets. The next Part turns to those cases.
C. Leveling Down
As already noted, the Supreme Court endorsed downward ratchets in Santana-Morales and
Barr,110 but these are not the first cases where it has suggested that equality problems must be
resolved by making things worse for the advantaged class.111 The import of these earlier cases
has been obscured by the Court’s choice to talk about the problem in terms of standing and
severability rather than ratchets, but careful analysis makes clear that the three problems
intersect.
In some of these cases, the Court recognized the theoretical possibility of a downward ratchet
and held that that possibility did not destroy standing. For example, in Orr v. Orr,112 the Court
invalidated a state statute that provided that husbands but not wives could be awarded alimony
upon divorce. Faced with a challenge to the plaintiff’s standing on the ground that the state
might respond by leveling down, the Court stated that “this argument quite clearly proves too
much.”113 That was so because “[i]n every equal protection attack upon a statute challenged as
underinclusive, the State may satisfy the Constitution’s commands either by extending benefits
to the previously disfavored class or denying benefits to both parties. . . . Unless we are to hold
that all underinclusive statutes can never be challenged because any plaintiff’s success can
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theoretically be thwarted, Mr. Orr must be held to have standing here.”114 On the Court’s view,
the removal of an obstacle to Mr. Orr’s success was sufficient to provide him with standing, even
if there remained some possibility that he would ultimately be unsuccessful.
In other cases, however, the Court has found that plaintiffs had standing even when there was
no realistic possibility under existing law that they would ultimately prevail. For example, in
Heckler v. Mathews,115 the Court adjudicated an equality claim relating to gendered standards
for the award of Social Security survivor benefits. The statute that created the putative inequality
also contained a severability clause that stated that if the gendered distinction were invalidated,
the equality problem would be resolved by withdrawing benefits to the favored class.116 The
clause had the effect of dooming plaintiff’s chances of ever obtaining the benefits: If he
prevailed on the merits, the entire program would be dismantled and he would be left no better
off. But despite this fact, the Court held that plaintiff had standing and that the certain result of
his “victory” – a mandatory downward ratchet– was not an obstacle to the suit.117 The case
therefore stands for the proposition that in some circumstances, a court adjudicating an equality
claim must ratchet down.
The Heckler result might be explained by concern that Congress would be tempted to
manipulate severability determinations so as to shield its actions from constitutional review.118 If
nonseverability deprived parties of standing, Congress could prevent courts from ever

114

Id.
465 U.S. 728 (1984).
116
Id. at 734.
117
Id. at 738 (“because the right asserted by appellee is the right to receive ‘benefits . . . distributed
according to classifications which do not without sufficient justification differentiate among covered [applicants]
solely on the basis of sex . . . and not a substantive right to any particular benefits,’ appellee’s standing does not
depend on his ability to obtain increased Social Security benefits.”) (citation omitted.)
118
Cf. id. at 737 (discussing possibility that severability clause might be unconstitutional attempt to deprive
Court of jurisdiction).
115

25
adjudicating equality claims. But Northeastern Florida Chapter of Associated General
Contractors of America v. City of Jacksonville,119 and Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke,120 involving challenges to affirmative action requirements, cannot be so explained.
In both cases, a non-minority applicant was denied a benefit and filed suit challenging the
constitutionality of an affirmative action plan that favored minority applicants. It turned out,
though, that the non-minority applicant could not prove that she would have received the benefit
even if the affirmative action plan were not in place. In the absence of that proof, a litigation
victory would be virtually certain to produce a downward ratchet, with the non-minority
applicant left no better off and the minority applicants made worse off.121 These cases are
therefore analogous to the situation discussed above where an African American subject to the
death penalty sues not to block his own execution, but to require the execution of a comparable
white person.
One might suppose that a court would quickly dismiss such a claim, but in the context of
affirmative action, the Court has consistently held that the white applicant has standing.
According to the Court
When the government erects a barrier that makes it more difficult for members of one group
to obtain a benefit than it is for members of another group, a member of the former group
seeking to challenge the barrier need not allege that he would have obtained the benefit but
for the barrier in order to establish standing. The “injury in fact” in an equal protection case
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of this variety is the denial of equal treatment resulting from the imposition of the barrier, not
the ultimate inability to obtain the benefit.122
Although the Court has addressed the problem in the language of standing, the
implication of its decisions for the ratchet issue is clear: In at least some cases, the Constitution
requires the Court to resolve equality claims in a way that will produce a downward ratchet.123
Moreover, these are not cases like Heckler, where there is a risk that the government will
deliberately manipulate severability rules so as to shield its actions from constitutional attack.
For all that appears, white applicants in these cases would not receive the benefits they seek
under nondiscriminatory criteria adopted in good faith. But that fact, and the accompanying
certainty that victory for the plaintiff will result in leveling down, in no way impeaches their
claim.
It turns out, then, that there is precedent for the Court’s insistence on leveling down in
Morales-Santana and Barr. What is new, though, is the suggestion that leveling down may
become more frequent. To see why this is so, one must unpack the Barr Court’s new
understanding of the severability problem.
In his plurality opinion, Justice Kavanaugh distanced himself from a severability test that
turned on the Court’s assessment of what Congress would have intended had it known that a
portion of the statute had been invalidated.124 Reflecting the values of “the new textualism,” he
insisted that in cases where the statute contains a severability clause, courts ought to implement
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it.125 Where the statute contains no severability clause, the Court should adopt a strong
presumption that it should excise only the offending provision while leaving the rest of the
statute in place.126 In Justice Kavanaugh’s view
The presumption . . . reflects the confined role of the Judiciary in our system of separated
powers—stated otherwise, the presumption manifests the Judiciary’s respect for Congress’s
legislative role by keeping courts from unnecessarily disturbing a law apart from invalidating the
provision that is unconstitutional.127
Although Justice Kavanaugh spoke for only three justices, Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Kagan,
and Sotomayor all wrote or joined opinions agreeing that the offending provision should be
severed.128
If there is in fact a majority supporting Justice Kavanaugh’s position, what implications
does this position hold for the ratchet question?129 There is an obvious problem with
implementing the approach in equality cases. Justice Kavanaugh asserts that courts should sever
and eliminate only the “offending provision,”130 but in equality cases the offense is produced by
the intersection of two provisions, one of which extends a benefit and one of which denies a
benefit. Which one should be eliminated?
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The plurality answers this question by distinguishing between the “exception” and the “rule”
with the exception excised and the rule preserved.131 As the plurality also wisely concedes
“there can be knotty questions about what is the exception and what is the rule.”132 The future
implications of its approach are therefore uncertain.133
This much is clear, however: The approach requires downward ratchets in an important class
of cases. Where the exception extends a benefit to one class and the rule withholds it from
another, equality problems must be resolved by making things worse for the advantaged class
and no better for the disadvantaged class.
As if to emphasize this point, Justice Gorsuch’s partial dissent marshaled all the standard
arguments against downward ratchets. He pointed out that from the plaintiff’s point of view “it’s
hard to see how today’s use of severability doctrine qualifies as a remedy at all”134 and that “[i]t
isn’t even clear the plaintiffs would have standing to challenge the government-debt
exception.”135 What is the point, he asked “of fighting this long battle, through many years and
all the way to the Supreme Court, if the prize for winning is no relief at all?”136 Moreover,
Gorsuch’s point is strengthened by the fact that here the equality claim arises in a free speech
context:
[The First Amendment] pushes, always, in one direction: against governmental restrictions on
speech. Yet, somehow, in the name of vindicating the First Amendment, our remedial course
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today leads to the unlikely result that not a single person will be allowed to speak more freely
and, instead, more speech will be banned.137
But none of these arguments persuaded the plurality to abandon a downward ratchet. The
plurality thought that the provision of equal treatment fully remedied plaintiff’s constitutional
violation.138 There was no need to worry about deterring future suits because “many individuals
and organizations often have incentive to challenge unequal treatment of speech, especially when
a competitor is regulated less heavily.”139 According to the plurality, there was no doubt that
plaintiffs have standing to challenge unequal treatment that benefits others,140 and the fact that
the Court’s remedy led to the suppression of more speech was not a source for concern.141
We cannot know precisely how consequential this new approach will be until the Court sorts
out the vexing distinction between exception and rule. Meanwhile, though, an even more
troubling possibility lurks in the background. On some occasions, the Court has thought that the
hypothetical possibility of a downward ratchet means that courts should not change the status
quo at all. Although this approach is far from dominant, the Court has resorted to it more often
than is commonly recognized. The next Part discusses cases adopting this solution to the ratchet
problem.
D.

Hypothetical Leveling

The “neither up nor down” approach has disreputable origins that, one might suppose,
would serve to discredit it. Consider, for example, Cumming v. Board of Education.142
Cumming was decided in 1899, shortly after of the Court’s endorsement of the “separate but
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equal” standard in Plessy v. Ferguson143 and was written by Justice Harlan, the author of the
famous Plessy dissent.
The school board of Richmond County, Georgia had operated both a black and white
high school, but voted to close the black high school, supposedly for economic reasons.
Cumming, an African American taxpayer, sought an injunction against paying taxes that
supported only a white high school.144 The trial court denied that relief but ordered the county
not to support the white high school until it funded a comparable black school.145 Put differently,
it ordered a downward ratchet. The Georgia Supreme Court reversed,146 and the United States
Supreme Court affirmed that judgment.
Justice Harlan’s opinion offers a smorgasbord of arguments, evasions, and qualifications,
but for present purposes, here is the key passage:
The plaintiffs in error complain that the board of education used the funds in its hands to assist
in maintaining a high school for white children without providing a similar school for colored
children. The substantial relief asked is an injunction that would either impair the efficiency of
the high school provided for white children or compel the board to close it. But if that were
done, the result would only be to take from white children educational privileges enjoyed by
them, without giving to colored children additional opportunities for the education furnished
in high schools. The colored school children of the county would not be advanced in the
matter of their education by a decree compelling the defendant board to cease giving support
to a high school for white children.147
These are standard arguments against leveling down, and, one might have supposed, the
conclusion that followed would be that the Board was required to level up by funding a black
high school. But that is not the conclusion the Court reached. Instead, the Court reasoned,
because the problem might hypothetically have been solved by leveling down, and because
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leveling down benefited no one, therefore there was no requirement to level up or down.148 The
result is that a putative violation of the equality right is left unremedied.
Another infamous Supreme Court case from the period utilizes a similar technique. In Giles
v. Harris,149 decided in 1903, the plaintiff alleged that he and other African Americans in
Montgomery Alabama had been denied the right to register to vote because of their race, that the
denial “was part of a general scheme to disfranchise them”150 and that “[t]he part taken by the
state, that is, by the white population which framed the [state] Constitution, consisted in shaping
that instrument so as to give opportunity and effect to the wholesale fraud which has been
practised.”151
Writing for the Court, Justice Holmes responded:
The plaintiff alleges that the whole registration scheme of the Alabama Constitution is a fraud
upon the Constitution of the United States, and asks us to declare it void. . . . If . . . we accept
the conclusion which it is the chief purpose of the bill to maintain, how can we make the court
a party to the unlawful scheme by accepting it and adding another voter to its fraudulent lists?
. . . It is not an answer to say that if all the blacks who are qualified according to the letter of
the instrument were registered, the fraud would be cured. . . . If the sections of the
Constitution concerning registration were illegal in their inception, it would be a new doctrine
in constitutional law that the original invalidity could be cured by an administration which
defeated their intent.152
It is not easy to decipher this logic, but the Court’s point seems to be something like this: If
plaintiff’s allegations were proved, that would mean that Montgomery’s entire voting scheme
was invalid. But if that were true, no one should be permitted to register. Put differently, ruling
for the plaintiff would mean a massive downward ratchet, prohibiting whites and blacks alike
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from voting. Because this hypothetical downward ratchet was unthinkable, therefore the state
could maintain the unequal and unconstitutional status quo.
Cumming and Giles were decided over a century ago. It is easy to dismiss them as relics
rooted in a disreputable past that we have finally disowned. Yet remnants of this approach
continue to infect our jurisprudence.
Consider, for example, Justice Thomas’s opinion, joined by Justice Alito in Sessions v.
Morales-Santana.153 Recall that majority found gender discrimination in an immigration statute
unconstitutional, but elected to level down by withdrawing the preferential treatment from the
benefited class.154 Justice Thomas agreed that leveling up was “not . . . an appropriate remedy
for any equal protection violation.” For him, though, leveling down was not appropriate either.
“Because respondent cannot obtain relief in any event, it is unnecessary for us to decide whether
[the statute] was constitutional.”155 Put differently, he thought that the prospect of a downward
ratchet required leaving the putatively discriminatory policy in place.
Justice Thomas did not command a majority in Sessions, but his view finds support in a
smattering of Supreme Court precedent. In Levin v. Commerce Energy,156 the Court accepted an
admittedly milder and less consequential version of the argument. The case dealt with a suit
brought in federal court claiming that the state’s tax scheme unconstitutionally discriminated
against the plaintiff. The Court began its analysis with the familiar observation that in equality
cases “[h]ow equality is accomplished – by extension or invalidation of the unequally distributed
benefit or burden, or some other measure – is a matter on which the Constitution is silent.”157

153
154
155
156
157

137 S. Ct. 1678, 1701 (2020) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part).
See TAN xx, supra.
137 S. Ct., at 1701 (Thomas J., concurring in the judgment in part).
560 U.S. 413 (2010).
Id. at 427.

33
But the Court faced a special problem in this case because the Tax Injunction Act158 as well as a
broader comity doctrine that counseled against federal interference with state taxes prevented
federal courts from enjoining the collection of state taxes. That meant that the federal court could
not solve the problem by granting the plaintiff a comparable exemption, since such an exemption
would entail an injunction against collection of the tax owed by the plaintiff.159 This disability
might have led to the conclusion that the Court should solve the equality problem by invalidating
the exemption – an outcome that would have been permissible under the Tax Injunction Act.
Instead, though, the Court held that the impossibility of extending the benefit meant that it
should not entertain jurisdiction over the matter at all.160 At least in theory, this resolution
preserved the ability of state courts to remedy the inequality with the (small) chance of ultimate
review on certiorari by the United States Supreme Court. Viewed in a certain way, it could
therefore be rationalized as another case where states were free to ratchet up or down as they
chose. But the Supreme Court went beyond following its more usual practice of simply
remanding the case to a lower court to resolve the ratchet problem.161 Instead, it held that lower
federal courts should refused to adjudicate the underlying dispute and therefore left the putative
substantive equality violation in place.
On other occasion, the modern Court has adopted more consequential versions of the neitherup-nor-down approach. The Court’s treatment of the commercial speech problem provides an
example. The Court has held that commercial speech claims can be defeated by outlawing the
underlying activity. If the activity itself is illegal, then the government can also outlaw
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advertising promoting the activity.162 This holding leaves the government with the choice of
either ratcheting up by permitting the activity and advertising associated with it or ratcheting
down by prohibiting the activity and the advertising associated with it. In its now overruled
decision in Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico,163 the Court held
that the theoretical possibility of a downward ratchet meant that the government need not ratchet
up or down. The Court reasoned that because Puerto Rico could have outlawed gambling
altogether, it could also
take the less intrusive step of allowing the conduct, but reducing the demand through
restrictions on advertising. . . . It would surely be a Pyrrhic victory for casino owners . . . to
gain recognition of a First Amendment right to advertise their casinos . . . only to thereby
force the legislature into banning casino gambling . . . altogether. It would just as surely be a
strange constitutional doctrine which would concede to the legislature the authority to totally
ban a product or activity, but deny to the legislature the authority to forbid the stimulation of
demand for the product or activity through advertising on behalf of those who would profit
from such increased demand.164
Posadas was not an equal protection case, but its reasoning holds obvious implications for
equality claims. The argument mirrors the “greater includes the lesser” approach adopted by
Justices Harlan and Holmes in Cumming and Giles: Because the government can satisfy
constitutional requirements by using the greater power to make things worse for everyone (e.g.,
both people running gambling facilities and people promoting them), therefore it also has the
lesser power of making things worse for only some (people promoting the facilities).
The Court has now overruled Posadas and adopted the “strange constitutional doctrine” that
Justice Rehnquist warned against.165 Today, at least in the free speech context, the Court insists
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that the theoretical possibility of a downward ratchet “Pyrrhic victory” does not justify
maintaining the status quo. Similarly, as discussed above, the Court has held that discriminatory
treatment of religious institutions does cannot escape free exercise challenges because of the
possibility that the state could eliminate the program altogether.166 Nor can most equal
protection claims be dismissed because of the possibility of a downward ratchet.167
But although the Posadas holding has been discredited, its logic remains powerful and
continues to influence how the Court thinks about ratchets. In particular, the approach resonates
with a “prediction” theory to resolve the ratchet problem.
One version of the theory is uncontroversial. Consider, for example, the Court’s recent
statement about how the equality requirement functions in Title VII cases regarding job
discrimination: “Take an employer who fires a female employee for tardiness or incompetence
or simply supporting the wrong sports team. Assuming the employer would not have tolerated
the same trait in a man, Title VII stands silent.”168
The key words are “would not have.” Suppose that a woman has been fired for rooting for the
wrong sports team, but a man rooting for the same team keeps his job. Then we have a
straightforward example of unequal treatment based upon sex. But now suppose that the issue
about male-sports-team malfeasance has never arisen. In that event, the court must engage in
prediction: what would the employer do if a male case arose. If, hypothetically, the male would
also have been fired, then firing the woman does not deny equality. It follows that neither an
upward nor downward ratchet is required.
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The prediction theory becomes more controversial in cases where we already know that the
equality norm has been violated. Does a prediction that downward ratcheting would be utilized
to remedy the violation justify maintaining the status quo? The closely related problem posed by
unconstitutional conditions suggests that it might. A putatively unconstitutional condition arises
when the government threatens to perform an otherwise lawful act if an individual exercises a
constitutional right.169 For example, a prosecutor might threaten to charge a more serious
offense if a defendant does not plead guilty and exercises her constitutional right to go to trial,170
or the government may withhold a tax exemption if the taxpayer does not forego his right to
engage in constitutionally protected speech.171
There are a variety of solutions to this problem, none of them entirely satisfactory, but a
number of commentators have settled on an approach resting on hypothetical downward ratchets.
For example, according to Einer Elhauge’s synthesis:
a threat to engage in otherwise-lawful action . . . is unlawfully coercive only when the threat is
contrived, meaning that the threatened action would not have occurred if no threat could have
been made. . . . When a threat is contrived, the government benefit would have been provided
in the but-for world without that condition, and thus the threat to withhold the benefit
penalizes the exercise of a constitutional right. When the threat is uncontrived, the
government benefit would not have been provided in that but-for world, and thus withholding
the benefit imposes no penalty.”172
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How does this formulation translate into the language of ratchets? In cases where a court
predicts that the government would have leveled up by providing the benefit to everyone, then
the threat is “contrived” and the condition is unconstitutional. But if a court predicts that the
government hypothetically would have leveled down by abolishing a program for everyone
rather than extending it to the disfavored class, then the threat is real and is constitutional.
The Court’s decisions concerning government funding for abortion illustrate how the
approach might work in practice. In Maher v. Roe,173 the Court upheld a state regulation that
provided poor women with Medicaid funding for live childbirths, but not for nontherapeutic
abortions. In Harris v. McRae,174 the Court extended Maher to uphold the so-called “Hyde
Amendment,” which denied Medicaid funding for all abortions except where the life of the
pregnant person was threatened or where the person was impregnated by rape or incest.
In each case, the Court answered the argument that the due process clause prohibited this
discrimination, by pointing to the hypothetical possibility of leveling down. The state could have
leveled down by denying funding to everyone. Because of this theoretical possibility, the Court
held, it had no obligation to level up or down. As the Harris Court put the point, “[T]he Hyde
amendment leaves an indigent woman with at least the same range of choice in deciding whether
to obtain a medically necessary abortion as she would have had if Congress had chosen to
subsidize no health care at all.”175 Or as the Maher court opined, “An indigent woman who
desires an abortion suffers no disadvantage as a consequence of Connecticut’s decision to fund
childbirth; she continues as before to be dependent on private sources for the services she
desires.”176
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To be clear, Elhauge himself does not think that his test can overcome equal protection
objections. He writes that “sometimes even an uncoerced agreement to a condition or contract
would be independently illegal or unconstitutional, usually because it would harm third parties or
violate equal protection norms.”177 And although the claims in Harris and Maher both turned on
the government’s unequal treatment of abortion services, Court’s comments were directed solely
to the plaintiff’s due process arguments.
For now, then, a hypothetical ratchet solution remains decidedly disfavored. It is supported
by discredited or overruled cases like Cumming, Giles, and Posadas. It has gained traction with
regard to related ratchet problems in the due process context. The Court has resorted to it in the
equality context when faced with the special situation posed by Levin, and Justices Thomas and
Alito seem to favor it more broadly. But it is not anything like a standard response to equality
ratchet questions.
Still, the approach lurks menacingly in the background. Even if no court endorses it, the
approach may influence which cases are brought. As Deborah L. Brake has argued, the
permissibility of leveling down “confront[s] persons disadvantaged with inequality with a double
bind: challenge the inequality and risk worsening the situation for others instead of improving
one’s own situation, or continue to endure unlawful discrimination.”178 To the extent that
litigants chose the latter option, governments need not face the choice between leveling up or
down, and the hypothetical ratchet solution retains spectral force.179
Another reason the approach cannot be entirely ruled out is because of the seemingly
powerful logic that supports it. The logic is especially strong when leveling up is impossible.
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Suppose that a lifeboat is filled to capacity when Jack Dawson swims up to the side.180 Dawson
is in every way equal to those already on the boat.181 Leveling up is impossible because all
cannot be saved. Does it really make sense to level down by letting all drown?182 Many people
will conclude that the inevitability of downward leveling if we insist on equality justifies the
inequality entailed in allowing Dawson to drown.183 Similarly, one might fairly ask, what is the
point of ending high school education for white children if the deprivation will not result in high
school education for black children? If a court accurately predicts that finding an equal
protection violation would produce only a “Pyrric Victory” for the plaintiff, why should this
outcome be treated as a victory at all?
The answers to these questions, if indeed there are answers, depend on why we value equality
in the first place. The next Part addresses that problem.

II. Ratchets and Reasons
Unsurprisingly, we can find both the roots of the ratchet problem and possible solutions to it
by thinking about the reasons for an equality requirement in the first place. Different reasons
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lead to different ratchet rules. If the justices had consistent and coherent ideas about reasons,
they could produce consistent and coherent rules.
In this Section, I advance two arguments. First, I hope to show how different, plausible
rationales for the equality requirement cohere with different rules for ratchets. Second, I argue
that none of these rationales can be mapped onto all of the Court’s cases. In fact, the Court has
no consistent and coherent ideas about reasons. It is therefore fated to produce inconsistent and
incoherent rules about ratchets.
A.

Welfarism and Ratchets

Neoclassical economics provides a useful starting point for thinking about equality and
ratchets. As summarized by Louis Koplow and Steven Shavell, “[w]elfare economics . . . is
equivalent to the moral position that the design of the legal system should depend wholly on
concerns for human welfare.”184 Their definition of welfare, in turn, is comprehensive, including
“not only individuals’ levels of material comfort, but also their degree of aesthetic fulfillment,
their feelings for others, and anything else that they might value, however intangible.”185
Kaplow and Shavell contrast their welfarist approach with a “fairness” approach that focuses on
“justice, rights, and cognate concepts” and treats “reasons that are not reducible to concerns
about individual’s well-being as . . . independent evaluative principles – principles employed to
assess the desirability of legal rules without regard to the effects of the rules on individuals’ wellbeing.”186
Kaplow and Shavell make the striking claim that legal rules should be evaluated solely in
terms of their effect on welfare and should not be influenced by whether they meet the criteria
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for fairness. Part of their justification for this position is that under certain circumstances,
fairness considerations violate the requirements of Pareto efficiency.187 Under the Pareto
standard, a change that makes at least one person better off but no one worse off
uncontroversially enhances human welfare and therefore ought to be made. Conversely, a
change that makes at least one person worse off but no one better off is inefficient and should be
avoided. 188 Kaplow and Shavell seek to demonstrate that introducing fairness criteria inevitably
leads to this kind of inefficiency.189
At least at first, it seems that downward ratchets to achieve equality are straightforward
examples of rules that violate the Pareto standard and illustrate the evil that a “fairness” standard
produces.190 Downward ratchets definitionally make at least one person worse off while making
no one better off. It seems to follow that on a welfarist approach, courts should adopt a
mandatory upward ratchet.191 Where upward ratchets are impossible or unlikely, courts should
use the prediction approach and maintain the unequal status quo because remedying the
inequality with a downward ratchet reduces human welfare.
Many, but certainly not all, of the Court’s cases suggest this welfarist approach. No doubt,
the Court’s preference for upward ratchets outlined in Part One reflects the intuition that
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downward ratchets do no one any good.192 Similarly, its occasional willingness to tolerate
inequality when only a downward ratchet might remedy it reflects welfarist sensibilities.193
That said, Part One also discusses many cases where the Court has permitted – and on a few
occasions mandated – leveling down.194 That result, too, is unsurprising, but only because of
difficulties with the welfarist approach, at least as applied to equality.
There are three problems. First, welfarism risks reading the equality requirement out of the
Constitution. At its core, equality requires treating people the same to the extent that they are
similarly situated,195 Of course, that definition produces significant difficulties given the fact
that people are both the same and different along an infinite range of dimensions. Perhaps, as
some scholars have asserted, that makes the requirement “empty.”196 It is nonetheless selfevident that sameness can be achieved by either an upward or downward ratchet. It follows that
so long as an equality mandate is part of the Constitution, the law must require downward
ratchets when upward ratchets are impossible. Put differently, when leveling up is off the table,
a rule prohibiting leveling down denies equality and, therefore, violates the Constitution.
Welfarists might be more than ready to concede this point. Indeed, their whole argument is
that standards of fairness should be abandoned precisely because they lead to Pareto inefficient
downward ratchets. As social critics, they are free to make this argument. Perhaps judges
should be free to accept it, but doing so would require them to reject the Fourteenth
Amendment’s mandate of equal protection. That is asking quite a lot of them.
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This argument amounts to an external critique of welfarism as applied to ratchets, but there
are also two internal critiques. First, Kaplow and Shavell want to make their theory as attractive
as possible by defining human welfare very broadly. On their view, it includes “not only
individuals’ levels of material comfort, but also their degree of aesthetic fulfillment, their
feelings for others, and anything else that they might value, however intangible.”197
This broad definition is necessary to make welfarism uncontroversial. Unfortunately, though,
it also risks making the standard trivial. As Kaplow and Shavell acknowledge, if people have a
“taste” for fairness, then fairness might be welfare enhancing, and the very factor that they wish
to exclude gets introduced through the back door.198

This point extends to the particular type of

fairness embodied in the equality norm. Koplow and Shavell admit that “[t]o the extent that
people have a taste for some notion of equality (in the sense that they feel better off when the
notion is reflected in the law) this taste will be credited in assessing individual’s well-being and
thus in determining social welfare.”199 Although they are not completely clear on the point,200
they seem to recognize that downward leveling might be justified when this is true.201
Importantly, this approach turns issues about equality into an empirical problem. Downward
leveling is justified to the extent – but only to the extent – that people actually do have a “taste”
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for equality. Unfortunately, Kaplow and Shavell are mostly silent about how this empirical
question might be resolved.202 Perhaps an insistence on upward ratchets can be rescued by the
intuition that, at least when it is explained to them, people do not actually prefer “fair” outcomes
that otherwise leave no one better off.203
Suppose that we come to the opposite conclusion and believe that people (most people? all
people?) do not experience an improvement in their welfare by the mere knowledge that others
are treated as badly as they are.

A second internal critique argues that downward ratchets might

still be justified under a welfarist approach if they served nonobvious or long-term instrumental
goals. Perhaps temporary downward ratchets lead to long term upward ratchets. Perhaps they
affect social attitudes toward disadvantaged groups that ultimately produce material
improvements in their welfare. Perhaps they influence overall social norms in ways that promote
a solidarity and empathic connection that makes people feel happier or more fulfilled. To the
extent that any of these things is true, and even if we rule out a mere “taste” for equality,
downward ratchets might satisfy welfarist criteria.
The next two sections address these internal critiques.
B.

Noninstrumental Equality and Ratchets

Does a noninstrumental “taste” for equality explain the Court’s ratchet rules? On this
approach equality is a good in itself that people value regardless of its material consequences.
Even if this is true, the resulting rules for ratchets should still include a preference for upward
ratchets. Equality is a good, but not the only good. When it can be achieved without cost to
either party, that is a preferable outcome. But when upward ratchets are difficult or impossible,
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the approach permits downward ratchets. Because, on this view, equality is a good in itself, the
benefit from achieving it might outweigh the material costs imposed on the parties. Many –
although concededly not all – of the Court’s cases seem to take something like this approach.
Consider in particular the special standing rules for equal treatment cases. As discussed
above, the Court has held that a plaintiff has standing to raise equal protection claims even if she
would not receive any material benefit from the remedy. According to the Court, “[t]he ‘injury
in fact’ . . . is the denial of equal treatment resulting from the imposition of the barrier, not the
ultimate inability to obtain the benefit.”204
At first, this explanation seems inadequate to differentiate equality cases from other standing
problems. In most cases, the Court insists that the plaintiff demonstrate both a constitutional
violation and that the violation caused the plaintiff to suffer an “injury in fact.” Suppose, for
example, that the government is illegally polluting a lake with a substance that causes illness, but
the plaintiff cannot prove that she actually uses the lake. The Supreme Court has held that she
lacks standing because she cannot demonstrate that the illegal conduct is the but/for cause of her
injury.205 But in equality cases, these two requirements are conflated. The mere fact of
constitutional violation provides standing even if the violation produced no material injury.
The rule makes more sense, though, if one thinks of equality as an independent,
noninstrumental good. Then the mere denial of equality causes injury even if the remedy is a
leveling down that provides the plaintiff with no material advantage.206
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As noted above,207 arguments along these lines face daunting empirical problems. They
proceed on the undemonstrated empirical assumption that people in fact value equality as a
noninstrumental good even when equal treatment leaves everyone otherwise worse off. At best,
then, the argument clears the way for downward leveling without proving that is justified. Still,
it might be possible to isolate cases where it seems most likely that people have a
noninstrumental “taste” for fairness. Widely held theories about equality, including
expressivism, protection against caste, and protection against subordination might point the way
to such cases.
Expressivists endorse legal rules that do no more than send a message about the kind of
society we live in and the appropriate role of government.208 For example, the Supreme Court
has held that voting districts deliberately and ostentatiously drawn along racial lines are suspect
because they “reinforce[ ] the perception that members of the same racial group . . . think alike,
share the same political interests, and will prefer the same candidates at the polls.”209 Similarly,
the Justices have sometimes held that religious symbols on government property are
unconstitutional when they send a message that members of minority religious groups are
“outsiders.”210
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Expressivist theories, taken by themselves, could apply to rights not grounded in equality, but
when reinforced by anti-caste and anti-subordination theories it becomes clear why they have
special purchase in equality cases.211
Some prominent defenders of the equality norm have conceptualized it as a protection against
a caste system.212 Lower caste individuals frequently suffer material disadvantage, but this
disadvantage is not a necessary feature of caste. What is necessary is the existence of certain
fixed groups that suffer from stigma and exclusion.213 The wider society views members of
these groups as disgusting, shiftless, dirty, and untrustworthy.214 Those conditions, in turn, are
produced by a web of social meaning that the government contributes to by sending a message
that members of the disadvantaged class are inferior and, perhaps, not fully human.215
Similarly, a condition of subordination is defined by the absence of social power, but that
absence cannot be reduced to inferior material conditions.216 The Court that decided Brown v.
Board of Education presumably had this point in mind when it held that segregated education
was “inherently unequal” even if material conditions were equalized.217 Once again, the
inequality resulted from the social message of inferiority conveyed by separation – a message
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that, in the Court’s words, “generate[d] a feeling of inferiority . . . that may affect . .. hearts and
minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.”218
For these reasons, noninstrumental justifications might be especially important with regard to
the equality norm. These justifications also cohere with many of the Court’s ratchet rules. For
example, they explain the outcome in Prince Edward.219 On the facts of that case, downward
leveling sent an unmistakable social message about black inferiority. Judicial tolerance of a
decision to close public schools entirely to avoid the necessity of blacks coming into contact with
whites would have reenforced caste in dramatic fashion.220
Unfortunately, though, it is difficult or impossible to reconcile a noninstrumental approach
with other strands of the Court’s jurisprudence. At the simplest level, any theory that explains
Prince Edward cannot explain Palmer because the cases are simply irreconcilable.221
But the difficulty goes beyond mere tension between two individual decisions. Consider
again the problem of standing. A nonminority person who is not admitted to a medical school
has standing to complain about an affirmative action program even if she cannot show that the
program caused her rejection.222 But what about an African American who witnesses her
brothers and sisters murdered in the streets by police officers? The African American witness
does not have standing to complain about a constitutional violation even though toleration of
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racial bias in policing sends a social message that contributes to subordination and caste.223 Why
not?
Part of the explanation lies in the Court’s endorsement of an individualist theory of equality
and rejection of a group rights theory. Suppose, for example, an employer provides a pension to
male and female employees and requires them to make the same contributions to the fund. From
the perspective of group rights, the policy discriminates against men because women on average
live longer and will therefore receive more benefits even though they have made the same
contributions. But the Court has strongly suggested that the practice does not violate the equality
norm because, on the individual level, it treats all employees equally. 224 Conversely, if women
are required to contribute more to take into account of their longer lifespans, the Court has
suggested that equality would be violated because individual women would be treated
unequally.225
Similarly, in the affirmative action context, the rejected applicant has standing because she as
an individual has been subject to discriminatory treatment even though the treatment did not
result in material disadvantage. The African American witness to police violence suffers injuries
associated with the reinforcement of caste and subordination, but on the Court’s view these are
not individual injuries. Instead, they result from membership in a disadvantaged group.226
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One can debate the respective merits of the group and individual rights approaches, but one
thing seems clear: The individual rights approach cannot be reconciled with anti-caste and antisubordination theories. Those theories are all about membership in groups. The theories rest on
understandings of how social meaning constitutes groups and enforces a hierarchy between
them. It makes no sense to say, for example, that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits caste and
then to say that it protects only individuals without regard to whether they belong to a lower
caste.
For similar reasons, expressivist, anti-caste, and anti-subordination rationales are in tension
with the Court’s embrace of equal protection formalism. The Court has consistently held that it
makes a crucial difference whether a law or government policy facially discriminates on a
suspect basis.227 If the discrimination is not along suspect lines, it is subject only to “rational
basis” review, which is usually easily satisfied. That is true even if the actual effect of the
legislation disproportionately harms subordinated groups. Heightened review is appropriate only
if there is facial discrimination on a suspect basis or if the purpose behind a facially neutral
statute is to discriminate on a suspect basis.228
From an expressivist perspective, there are two difficulties with this approach. First,
depending on social conditions, discrimination along suspect lines may or may not reenforce
caste or subordination.229 Imagine, for example, that a local school board with a majority of
African American members decides that African American children have distinctive educational
needs best addressed by academies designed to deal with their problems. No one is forced to
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attend the academies, but non-African Americans are excluded. On the Court’s approach, the
policy would be subject to heightened review and almost certainly invalidated. Is it really
plausible that the policy reenforces caste and subordination?
Similarly, because affirmative action policies discriminate on a suspect basis, the Court has
subjected them to heightened scrutiny. But whatever might be said for and against these
policies, no one can claim that they stigmatize white people or send a social message that white
people are disgusting or inferior.
Second, sometimes facially neutral policies do reenforce caste and subordination. Consider,
for example, standardized tests used to hire government employees or to determine which
applicants are admitted to government-run universities. The tests purport to be neutral, but there
are inevitably controversial cultural assumptions and value judgments embedded within them.230
Most obviously, many tests assume that there is something called “standard English” and that
people who speak and write with different grammatical rules are making mistakes.231 Similarly,
the tests often assume that test takers share a common store of experiences and assumptions that
allow them to make sense of hypothetical fact patterns. Less obviously, the tests are premised on
controversial assumptions about which traits are desirable in students and employees. When
subjugated students and applicants predictably do worse on these tests, it sends a social message
that neutral standards of merit have determined that they are inferior and that their subjugation is
justified.
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I do not mean to claim that facially suspect classifications never contribute to subordination
and caste or that facially neutral classifications with discriminatory effects always do. Instead,
these examples illustrate that the messages sent by various government policies are socially
contingent. A Court truly devoted to expressivism would need to be sensitive to context and
historical location. Equality formalism blinds the justices to just that sensitivity. Because it
produces outcomes dictated by rigid rules rather than by careful attention to the message actually
conveyed, it cannot be reconciled with an anti-subordination or anti-caste approach.
To summarize: Treating equality as a noninstrumental good explains some of the Court’s
downward ratchet cases, but the approach is inconsistent with too much of the rest of its
jurisprudence to offer a comprehensive solution. Equality standing alone lacks noninstrumental
value when it is not tied to social messages that reinforce caste or subordination. The Court has
recognized as much by using very loose, rational basis review when classifications are not based
on suspect criteria.232 But the anti-caste and anti-subordination approaches are inconsistent with
the Court’s commitment to an equality individualism that rejects the relevance of group
membership and to an equality formalism that ignores the actual social messages conveyed by
government policy.
C.

Nonobvious Instrumentalism and Ratchets

A final approach concedes arguendo the welfarist point that equality is only an instrumental
good but insists that welfarist critics have understated its instrumental value. Even if downward
ratchets have a superficial negative effect on welfare, they sometimes produce nonobvious or
long-term gains.
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One version of this argument mostly restates the points made in the previous Part. It is easy to
recharacterize expressivist approaches as actually grounded in instrumental concerns. On this
theory, opposition to government messaging that promotes caste and subordination is not just
about the intrinsic evil of the message. Countering these messages also achieves long-term good
results that follow for all Americans when caste and subordination are undermined.233
Because I have already discussed both the attractions of and the problems with this approach,
I will not repeat the arguments here. However, there are other examples of nonobvious or
indirect gains produced by downward ratchets that do merit discussion.
1.

Competition. Perhaps the clearest case for such gains arises when parties are in direct

competition with each other.234 Consider, for example, Levin v. Commerce Energy, Inc.235
Plaintiffs complained about a state tax scheme that imposed a higher tax on independent natural
gas distributors than on competing local distribution companies. As discussed above, the Court
ended up dismissing the case because the Tax Injunction Act in effect prohibited an upward
ratchet.236 In fact, though, leveling down would have improved the plaintiffs’ welfare and
provided an effective remedy for the putative constitutional violation. By increasing the costs
borne by its rival, a downward ratchet would have leveled the playing field, thereby improving
the plaintiffs’ competitive standing.237
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Deciding when a downward ratchet is justified on these grounds requires determining
when parties are in competition, and the answer to that question is not always clear. Are
robocallers for political candidates in competition with robocalling collectors of government
debt?238 Certainly not in an obvious way, but it is at least conceivable that some people with
limited financial means must choose between paying off government debt and making campaign
contributions. Are potential African American victims of the death penalty in competition with
potential non-African American victims?239 Again, not in an obvious way, but perhaps our
society has only a limited taste for violent retribution that might be satisfied without executing so
many African Americans if more non-African Americans were executed.
If one is inventive enough, it is possible to fit virtually any case under the competition
rubric. Still, there are cases where the Court has permitted or required leveling down and where,
as a practical matter, competition does not seem to explain the outcome. It is hard to see how
the unmarried men who asked the Court to make their children American citizens in MoralesSantana were in competition with unmarried women who wanted the same thing. It seems much
more likely that when the Court ordered a downward ratchet, it advanced neither party’s welfare.
Similarly, the man who sought to be relieved of his alimony obligations in Orr v. Orr240 would
get no benefit from forcing women who were not parties to the suit to pay alimony to their
spouses. If there are instrumental explanations for leveling down in these cases, they must be
grounded in a different theory.
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2.

Equality as bluff.

One such theory relies on the possibility of downward ratchets to

encourage the government to grant rights that it might otherwise deny. Consider, as an example,
the problem of positive rights – that is, rights to affirmative government measures designed to
protect individuals from oppression in the private sphere.

These rights are broadly disfavored

in American constitutional law,241 but advancing equality claims might be an effective tactic to
provide indirect protection for them.
For example, in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services242
the Supreme Court rejected the claim that the Due Process Clause guaranteed the right of a
young boy to government protection from an abusive father. But in a little-noticed, two-sentence
footnote the Court pointed to another tactic that might produce such protection. “The State may
not, of course, selectively deny its protective services to certain disfavored minorities without
violating the Equal Protection Clause. . . . But no such argument has been made here.” 243
The footnote suggests the possibility of utilizing equality and downward ratchets as a
bluff. The state could deny protective services to all children, but, the Court suggests, if it
provides the services to some but not others, that failure might violate the equality norm. No one
actually wants or expects the government to respond to the violation by depriving all children of
protection. Still, a judicial threat that it would have to do so might force the government to
extend protection to the disfavored class.244
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One way to think about this approach is that it builds on and modifies the hypothetical
ratchet method for dealing with unconstitutional conditions. Recall that the model requires a
court to guess whether the government would level up or down if deprived of the choice to
provide something unequally.245 If a court predicts that the government would level down, then
the government need not level up. Perhaps, though, we should not rely on such predictions and
instead insist on what economists call “revealed preferences.” The government should be put to
an actual choice by the credible threat of being forced to level down if it refuses to level up.
Of course, one problem with bluffs is that they are sometimes called. If the government
actually responds by leveling down, then we end up with the worst of both worlds: things are
made worse for the advantaged class, and the disadvantaged class still lacks the rights that it
seeks. The prediction approach allows the inequality to remain when judges predict a downward
ratchet. If there is an actual downward ratchet, then we need not rely on guesses. One might
therefore think that there is an even stronger case for allowing the government to continue the
unequal treatment. But advocates for equality bluffing have a powerful response. The problem
is that the threat must be made credible. It will not be credible if courts send a message that they
will quickly back down in the face of a downward ratchet.
Does this approach explain the Court’s cases? It may be right that courts should not
readily back down, but what about cases where there is essentially no chance that the threat will
work? Consider again Heckler v. Mathews,246 where the Court allowed a party to advance an
equality claim despite the fact that the statute’s nonseverability clause precluded any possibility
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of an upward ratchet.247 What is the point of threatening to level down when the government has
effectively precommitted itself to disregard the threat?
Perhaps carrying out the threat might still be justified to discourage such
precommitments. Perhaps the precommitment is less formidable than it seems, and the
legislature will repeal the nonseverability provision if put to the test. Perhaps to be really
credible, the threatening party must itself precommit to act even when doing so seems irrational.
But figuring out whether these strategies actually work is ultimately an empirical matter that
cannot finally be resolved by game theory alone. Maybe over the range of cases, sticking to
one’s guns will produce enough upward ratcheting to counterbalance the losses when the bluff is
called. But maybe not. In an odd way, then, advocates of equality bluffing are back in the
prediction business that they sought to escape.
A more serious problem with equality bluffs is that, on closer examination, they are not
really about equality at all. A true advocate of equality would be satisfied by a downward
ratchet, but by hypothesis, the bluffer does not really want to produce one. She is using the
threat of downward ratcheting as a mere tactic. The tactic is designed to vindicate some other
right not grounded in the equality norm.
For example, at least some people – almost certainly most people -- who invoke equality
to attack racial disproportionality in the infliction of capital punishment would not be happy if
more non-African Americans were executed. Where this is true, then what passes for an equality
argument is really an effort to take advantage of equality’s cultural resonance without actually
embracing the value itself. Advocates using this strategy are ready to use equality arguments to
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achieve their goals, but their real complaint is not about equality, but about some other principle
of justice.
But if that is the real complaint, why shouldn’t advocates be forced to defend it? If the
death penalty violates the Constitution regardless of whether it is equally administered then it
should be invalidated on that ground. If it doesn’t, then why should death penalty opponents be
permitted to achieve their objectives through equality’s back door?
3. Smoking out bad motives. A closely related argument is not merely parasitic on
equality’s reputation. Sometimes, the requirement of equal treatment serves to “smoke out” bad
motives that are inconsistent with the substantive constitutional norm.248 Where this is so, the
threat of downward ratchets harming the favored group might force the government to give up
on its illicit objectives.
The point is most easily illustrated by the content neutrality requirement in free speech
cases – the requirement that the Court relied upon in Barr to invalidate the robocall exception for
collectors of government debt. If the government prohibits loud sound trucks in residential areas
after midnight, it is plausible that it is acting to ensure that residents get a good night’s sleep.249
But suppose it prohibits sound trucks urging the election of Republican candidates but not those
urging the election of Democratic candidates. As noted above,250 this discrimination is
problematic because Democrats and Republicans compete with each other. But even if we put
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competition to one side, the discrimination is troublesome for an additional reason. Both types
of trucks inflict the same evil on residents. If the evil is serious enough to ban Republican
trucks, why isn’t it serious enough to ban Democratic trucks? Content discrimination gives rise
to a suspicion that the government is acting out of hostility to the ideas being expressed – a
motive that the first amendment makes illegitimate. Put differently, the government’s refusal to
level down by prohibiting all sound trucks tends to show that it is more concerned with
suppressing Republican ideas than with suppressing noise.251
Familiar equal protection principles rest on the same reasoning. At its core, the Equal
Protection Clause guarantees all inhabitants what Ronald Dworkin once called “equal concern
and respect.”252 When some people are treated better than others, the question arises whether the
distinction is based upon a legitimate government interest or whether it is based on animus
toward the disadvantaged group.253 In run-of-the-mill cases, there is a strong presumption that
the government is motivated by legitimate, public-regarding reasons, but when classification
involves a suspect criterion, it gives rise to the suspicion that the government is acting out of
animus. The suspicion can be put to rest only if the classification survives heightened
scrutiny.254 We might think of the purpose of this scrutiny as assessing whether the government
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would have imposed the same disability if the dominant group were also disadvantaged—that is,
if there were a hypothetical downward ratchet.255 When the scrutiny is “strict,” courts are almost
never satisfied. Actually leveling down, then, holds the government to its putatively pretextual
reason for the measure. In effect, the Court is saying that if the proffered reasons were real, both
groups would be disadvantaged. The Court proceeds as if they were real, and orders the
disadvantaging of both groups.
There are well-known problems with these equality theories. In particular, defenders of
the theories have had difficulty distinguishing either conceptually or empirically between
government motives based on mere animus or prejudice and government motives based on
legitimate public-regarding concerns.256 There is also reason to doubt that judges are better able
than legislators to suppress their own unconscious prejudices.257 And at least in the first
amendment context, the Court has recently insisted on equality of treatment even when content
discrimination is not attributable to a discriminatory purpose.258
Even if we accept the theories, though, they fail to cohere with the Court’s downward
ratchet decisions.

Consider again the government’s decision to make an exception from its

robocall ban for government debt collectors. Suppose we assume arguendo that the scheme was
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motivated by government opposition to the ideas expressed by the disfavored class. On this
hypothesis, a downward ratchet in effect allows the government to accomplish its
unconstitutional objective – the suppression of disfavored speech. Of course, favored speakers
are now also disadvantaged, but their loss in no way rectifies the constitutional evil, at least if we
assume that the speakers are not in competition with each other. True, innocent bystanders must
now bear some of the cost of the government’s unconstitutionally motivated restrictions, but that
fact does not change the reality that the restrictions remain in place.
A possible response to this argument is that, on the facts of Barr, it is quite unlikely that
the government really was motivated by animus against the speakers. The disfavored class
consisted of all other robocallers including commercial advertisers, charitable organizations,
political organizations, and scammers. Perhaps the government disfavored the speech of some of
these groups, but surely not the speech of all of them. The unequal treatment almost certainly
stemmed from a desire to favor a certain form of speech – speech necessary to collect
government debts and reduce the deficit – not a desire to suppress other speech because of its
content. Put differently, the most plausible explanation for the statute is that the stated reason for
it – to avoid the nuisance of unwanted robocalls – is not a sham at all and that the exception
derives from the reasonable view that the value of some of the calls outweighs the cost. 259
But if all this is true, then there is no reason for finding the distinction between speakers
unconstitutional in the first place. Advocates for the rule against content discrimination claim
that we need it to “smoke out” bad motives. If we can be reasonably confident that bad motives
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are not at work, and if the favored and disfavored speakers are not in competition, then the rule
serves no purpose.
To summarize: We are left with two possibilities. If the government is in fact motivated
by the desire to suppress certain kinds of speech, then a downward ratchet perversely achieves
the government’s unconstitutional objective. If the government is not motivated by the desire to
suppress certain kinds of speech, then the content discrimination should not make the statute
unconstitutional.
A parallel analysis casts doubt on downward ratchets in equal protection cases. As
discussed above,260 in Heckler v. Mathews,261 the Court held that a statute’s nonseverability
clause required leveling down to remedy an equal protection violation. Because Congress had
directed that the entire statute would fall if part of it were invalidated, a successful lawsuit would
result in denial of the benefit for everyone. 262
Suppose the statutory discrimination in Heckler reflected mere animus toward the
disadvantaged class. Then, the “remedy” in effect lets the government achieve its
unconstitutional objective. Indeed, the nonseverability clause suggests just how deep the
legislative animus was. One explanation for the clause is that legislators harbored so much
hatred for the disadvantaged group that, if necessary, they were even willing to disadvantage
favored groups so as to avoid the distasteful possibility of advantaging the disfavored group.
Ratcheting down in this situation permits the disadvantage to continue in just the cases where the
animus is most virulent.263
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Even if we put to one side these disturbing possibilities, there is an additional problem
with leveling down so as to “smoke out” unconstitutional motives. Doing so rests on a syllogism
that is logically unsound. The premise is that if the government was motivated by the publicregarding reason it has advanced, it would not have made the distinction that it has made. For
example, if the government were really motivated by the desire to control noise, it would have
banned Democratic as well as Republican sound trucks. The conclusion is that therefore, the
government should be held to its pretextual justification, and both Democratic and Republican
sound trucks should be banned.
But why does that conclusion follow? If the purported government objective is
pretextual, then the legislature was not really motivated by the desire to achieve it. It seems
perverse to punish the legislature by insisting on implementing a policy that, by hypothesis, the
legislature did not really favor. Of course, the possibility remains that the legislature
authentically favored the policy. But then it was not motivated by unconstitutional animus and
the classification should not be treated as unconstitutional in the first place.
III. Ratchets and Equality Ambivalence
The preceding discussion demonstrates that no equality theory explains all of the Court’s
ratchet decisions. Welfarist theories conflict with cases mandating downward ratchets and,
perhaps, with the equality requirement itself. Noninstrumental theories related to caste and
subordination might explain some downward ratchets, but not all of them and, in any event, do
not cohere with the Court’s overall approach to equality. Competition theories might justify
downward ratchets when the parties compete with each other, but the Court has also leveled
down in cases where the parties do not compete. “Bluffing” theories may or may not support

cherished good that people might value above more discrete tangible goods associated with tangible government
decision-making.”)
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leveling down but have nothing to do with the equality norm that the Court purports to be
advancing. Downward ratchets to smoke out pretext and bad motives risk giving the government
its way in exactly the cases where its motive is the worst and force the implementation of
pretextual policies that legislatures do not actually want to advance.
Part of the reason for this wreckage relates to pathologies in constitutional litigation that
extend beyond the ratchet issue. There are a variety of well-understood forces that obstruct clean
and consistent resolution of constitutional problems.
First, the court is a multimember institution whose members sometimes compromise and
logroll to achieve outcomes.264 The inevitable result is outcomes that fail to fully satisfy anyone
and that cannot be explained by a unitary theory. Changes in membership over time and voting
paradoxes are also bound to produce inconsistencies.265
Second, at least some of the time, the justices attempt to be “minimalists” who focus
solely on the case before them and eschew deep theorizing.266 Whatever the virtues of this
approach, it leaves them undisciplined by the push toward consistency provided by comparing
one case to another or by reconciling an outcome with a broader, justificatory framework.267
Finally, our constitutional practice is pluralist in the sense that justices have available to
them a variety of modalities that they can use to reach outcomes. Justices are free to choose
between arguments based on, for example, text, precedent, policy considerations, or a
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supposedly shared moral framework.268 This freedom constitutes an open invitation to reach
inconsistent outcomes by shifting among modalities in different cases.269
But although these general pathologies explain some of the problem, there are also
difficulties with the equality norm itself that explain the rest of it. To see the difficulties,
consider the most obvious way to clean up the ratchet wreck. Perhaps the Court should simply
overrule some or all of the cases where it has tolerated or mandated downward ratchets.
The solution is appealing, but it turns out that embracing it gives up on the only
possibility that makes the equality norm truly meaningful. Without it, as Peter Westen insisted
in his classic article written almost forty years ago, equality is “empty.”270
Westen’s argument was subtle, complex, and controversial, but it is easy to map out its
basic structure:
1.

Equality requires treating people alike to the extent that they are alike and differently to

the extent that they are different.
2.

But all people are both alike and different across an infinite range of dimensions.

3.

To give equality content, we must therefore identify a substantive rule rooted in a

conception of justice or law that identifies whether similarities are relevant.
4.

But once we have agreed on the substantive rule, then equality has no work to do. We

get to the right result by simply following the rule.271
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A modern example illustrates the point:
1.

Gay and straight marriages should be treated the same to the extent that they are the

same but differently to the extent that they are different.
2.

But gay marriages and straight marriages are both the same (because, for example, they

usually entail a deep commitment between two individuals) and different (because, for example,
the individuals have different combinations of anatomical equipment.)
3.

To decide whether gay and straight marriages are relevantly similar, we need a rule

rooted in substantive justice or law that sets out which characteristics are relevant to the right to
marry.
4.

But once we have identified the substantive rule about who can marry, we should follow

it, and the equality norm adds nothing to the analysis.
The argument is powerful, but it turns out it doesn’t quite do the work that Westen
expected of it. The theory does not deal with the possibility that for some reason we do not
follow the substantive rule in all cases. In that situation, equality is not “empty” if it requires
downward ratchets that expand the group for whom the rule is not followed.
Westen himself understood the point. Suppose, he wrote, that justice required all persons
in a certain class to receive a particular benefit. Westen recognized that some people accepted
the “odd” idea that equality might entail the uniform denial of the benefit if it could not be
granted to all.272 For Westen, “[t]his interpretation of like treatment, whatever else it may be, is
certainly not empty.” But, Westen continued “[t]he real trouble with the concept is not that it is
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empty, but that it is patently absurd. Indeed, it is so preposterous a moral proposition that, if it
were what equality really meant, no one would give it a moment's thought.”273
Perhaps Westen was right that the proposition is morally absurd, but he was surely wrong
when he says that no one would give the proposition a moment’s thought. On the contrary,
Ronald Dworkin’s moral intuition that people deserve “equal concern and respect” is deeply
embedded in our culture, as is the realization that when upward ratchets are unavailable, the real
test for our commitment to that equality comes when we are confronted with the prospect of a
downward ratchet. If we are unwilling to meet that test, then, just as Westen claimed, our
commitment to equality is, indeed, “empty.” The fact that most people do not think that it is
empty suggests why the argument for downward ratchets remains so powerful.
And yet, it is hard to shake Westen’s skeptical observations. He forces us to ask
opponents of capital punishment why equality should trump substantive justice if equal treatment
leads to the execution of more people. Should free speech advocates really be happier in a world
where the government suppresses more speech? Do advocates of gender equality who also care
about immigration really favor laws that make it harder for men and women alike to get
citizenship status for their children? Does it really make sense to take Jack Dawson on board if
doing so does not save his life and takes the lives of the other passengers?
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But Westen’s skeptical questions don’t quite end the matter. Isn’t there also something to be
said for the proposition that the passengers should not spend their last minutes on earth fighting
over who gets thrown overboard? Perhaps instead they should demonstrate human solidarity in
the face of death by all going down together. We are too committed to Dworkin’s moral insight
to let go of it completely. We prove just how seriously we take that insight when we celebrate
seemingly irrational downward ratchets to vindicate it.
Is it any wonder, then, that the justices are ambivalent about equality’s entailments? For
so long as that ambivalence persists, our ratchet rules will remain a wreck.
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